In this paper, we document a "play-out" effect in preference reversal experiments. We compare data where preferences are elicited using (1) purely hypothetical gambles, (2) played-out, but unpaid gambles and (3) played-out gambles with truth-revealing monetary payments. We ask whether a model of stable preferences with random errors (e.g., expected utility with errors) can explain the data. The model is strongly rejected in data collected using purely hypothetical gambles. However, simply playing-out the gambles, even in the absence of payments, shifts the data pattern so that noisy maximization is no longer rejected. Inducing risk preferences using a lottery procedure, using monetary incentives or both shift the data pattern further so that noisy maximization achieves the best possible fit to the aggregate data. No model could fit the data better. We argue that play-out shifts the response pattern by inducing value because subjects can use outcomes to "keep score." Induction or monetary payments create stronger induced values, shifting the pattern further.
undocumented effect in preference reversal data. When the gambles are purely hypothetical (gambles are not played-out or paid-out), the data is inconsistent with noisy maximization -the differences in preferences declared in pricing and choice tasks simply cannot be accommodated by stable preferences and random errors.
1 However, playing-out the gambles, even without paying subjects based on outcomes, shifts the pattern of responses. Noisy maximization is no longer rejected. We argue that this "play-out" effect arises because subjects can effectively "keep score" with the outcomes. This results in a weak form of induced value. 2 We also document a preference effect. Playing-out the gambles followed by a played-out, but unpaid, risk preference induction lottery (a la Berg, Daley, Dickhaut and O'Brien (1986)) shifts the response pattern further: Noisy maximization not only fits the data, but fits the data as well as any model possibly could in the sense that it maximizes the global likelihood function of the aggregate data. Playing-out allows subjects to keep score and risk preference induction strengthens players' preferences. These two effects result in more systematically consistent revealed preferences across gambles.
We also document an additional "payment" (incentives) effect. Paying subjects based on outcomes (which requires play-out), also shifts the pattern. Again, noisy maximization generally fits the data as well as any model could. Finally, comparing data where we induce preferences under a play-out only design (with no monetary incentives tied to outcomes) and in a playout/payment design (with monetary incentives), we show an incentive effect. Risk preferences estimated from prices move in the direction of induced risk preference in play-out only data, but are even closer with monetary incentives.
The key to our results is considering the entire pattern of responses instead of focusing only on reversal rates. In prior research (Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2010) ), we summarize research replicating Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) . Reversal rates range from 22% to 54%. Reversal rates are somewhat lower when subjects reveal preference through played-out gambles with payments based on truth-revealing payment methods, but rates remain high and the effect of incentives is only marginally significant (p-value = 0.0893). However, there is a significant change in the pattern of reversals. Replications without outcome contingent payments largely accord with Lichtenstein and Slovic's (1971) finding -a model of stable preferences expressed 1 We are not the first to point this out. See, for example Lichtenstein and Slovic's (1971) two-error-rate model analysis. 2 The idea is similar to Hsee, Yu, Zhang and Zhang (2003) , who argue that money, experimental currency units, points, or whatever the experimental medium of exchange is, becomes the objective of subjects. Subjects engage in "medium maximization" as a way of keeping score in the experiment even if the medium has no direct value. Consistent with this, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) observe that, sometimes, subject behavior accords with economic theory even without monetary payments.
with random error cannot explain the declared preference data. In contrast, truth revealing, monetary incentives typically result in patterns that are consistent with noisy maximization. Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2010) conclude that "incentives can generate more economically consistent behavior" presumably because the incentive structure creates a clearly defined objective function consistent with Smith's (1976) idea of induced value.
In related research on the preference effect (Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003) ), we show that inducing risk preferences can have a strong impact on the pattern of preference reversals as well. Commonly the gambles in preference reversal research have similar average payoffs but differ significantly in variance. One gamble, the "p-bet," has a high probably of a relatively low payoff and a low variance. The other, the "$-bet," has a low probability of a relatively high payoff and a high variance. Inducing risk aversion (risk seeking) creates a strong preferences for the p-bet ($-bet). This reduces reversal rates overall and makes the pattern consistent with noisy maximization. Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003) argue that the risk preference induction mechanism creates stronger preferences across gambles than simple induced value.
Here, we argue that a combination of three effects drives more coherent patterns in preference reversal data:
1. A "payment" effect: Subjects behave more coherently when being paid in a truth revealing manner based on outcomes. This is Smith's (1976) traditional, monetary induced value theory in context.
2.
A "preference" effect: Subjects behave more coherently when a lottery mechanism is used to induce stronger preferences across gambles. Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003) document this in experiments where subjects are paid based on outcomes. Here, we document the preference effect in sessions where outcomes are determined, but there are no subject payments tied to the outcomes.
3. A previously undocumented "play-out" effect: Subjects behave more coherently when gambles are played-out, even when subjects are not paid based on the outcomes.
Of course, to pay subjects based on outcomes, at least one outcome must be determined by playing it out. As a result, prior research confounds the play-out and payment effects. Here, we disentangle them and find an independent play-out effect.
II. Preference Reversal

A. Preference Reversal Tasks
In typical preference reversal research, 3 subjects evaluate pairs of gambles. The two gambles in a pair have approximately the same expected value, but differ in variance. One gamble, the "P-bet," has a high probability of winning a low amount while the other, the "$-bet,"
has a low probability of winning a large amount. The timeline for the typical subject in a preference reversal experiment (for example, Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) ) given in Figure 1 .
First, three pairs are presented to the subject who must state which gamble in each pair is preferred. Then, the subject values each individual gamble. Finally, the last three pairs are presented to the subject.
For each subject, the data on each gamble pair include the subject's choice between the two gambles and the valuations (typically prices) of each gamble. Each observation is either consistent (i.e., the gamble chosen in the choice task is the same as the gamble that is priced higher) or it represents a "reversal" because the chosen gamble and the highest price gamble are inconsistent. Figure 2 shows a typical pattern of data from a preference reversal experiment (specifically Lichtenstein and Slovic's (1971) Experiment 1). In Cell a, the P-Bet is both chosen and priced higher and, in Cell d, the $-Bet is both chosen and priced higher. These two cells represent consistent rankings. Cells b and c represent reversals with the P-Bet chosen but the $-Bet priced higher (Cell b) or the $-Bet chosen with the P-Bet priced higher (Cell c). The reversal rate is (b+c)/(a+b+c+d) = (441+32)/(88+441+32+477) = 0.456 = 45.6%. Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) show that their pattern of reversals is inconsistent with a model of stable underlying preference revealed with random error (i.e., "noisy maximization").
3 Including the experiments run for this paper and in Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003) . Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz ((2003) and (2010)) examine whether this model of "noisy maximization" fits the data when truth-revealing incentives are used in preference reversal experiments. In this paper, we ask whether playing-out the gambles alone has a similar effect.
To parameterize the model, let "q" represent the percentage of subjects who prefer the P-bet, "r" represent the error rate in the choice task (rate at which the non-preferred gamble is chosen) and "s" represent the error rate in the pricing task (rate at which the non-preferred gamble is valued higher). If we assume that errors in the choice task and the pricing task are random and independent (that is, making an error in the choice task does not affect the probability of making an error in the pricing task), then the pattern of observations generated in a preference reversal experiment should conform to Figure If behavior is explained by the two-error rate model, then these proportions are also functions of q, r and s as defined in Figure 3 . When solutions exist for q, r and s that match the observed frequencies, these solutions are the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters. 4 In fact, they would constitute a "best fit" model in the sense that these estimates maximize the global likelihood function of the aggregate data. These estimates are: 
Notice that the two error rate model cannot always be parameterized to fit the data. In particular, equation (1) may not have a real solution. If = 0.5, there is no solution for ̂ or .
Other estimates of , ̂ or ̂ may fall outside the valid 0 to 1 range. Whether the two-error-rate model can be parameterized to fit the data and, if not, whether restrictions imposed by the two error rate model are significant is one factor we use to determine whether play-out and/or payment affect behavior in preference reversal experiments.
4 See Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2010) for details. 5 Due to the quadratic form, there are two equivalent sets of parameters that satisfy these equations because q and 1-q are interchangeable. The resulting estimates of r and s are each one minus the original estimate. We do not take a stand on which set of estimates is "correct" because it is irrelevant to the likelihood function (both sets give the same likelihood) and, hence, to the likelihood ratio tests discussed below. We let the data choose which set we display in the tables by minimizing the sum of the error rates r and s. 
where: q = percentage of subjects whose underlying preference ordering ranks the P-bet higher r = error rate in the paired-choice task s = error rate in the pricing task III. Play-out, Payment and Preference Induction in Preference Reversal Experiments Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) and Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2010) show that the data from the Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) experiment differs significantly from a data pattern that could be explained by noisy maximization. This result is due to the overall pattern of choices as measured by conditional reversal rates (the reversal rate in one task conditional on the choice(s) in the other task), not simply the overall reversal rate. Results that are inconsistent with noisy maximization are generally the case in other preference reversal experiments when subjects are not paid based on the outcomes of their decisions. Here, we replicate this result in a new experiment. We also show that, in data from experiments where subjects are paid in a truth-revealing manner, reversals remain. However, the data accords with noisy maximization.
This holds for Grether and Plott (1979) experiment 1b, most of the experiments in the literature and on data aggregated across experiments.
In Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003) , we study how inducing risk preferences (using the Berg, Daley, Dickhaut and O'Brien (1986) lottery procedure) affects behavior. Again, the pattern accords with noisy maximization. In addition, creating a strong preference across gambles using risk preference induction can decrease the overall reversal rate.
All experiments in the literature to date use one of two incentive schemes: (1) the gambles are played-out and subjects receive outcome contingent payments or (2) the gambles are not played-out and subjects do not receive outcome contingent payments. Note that providing outcomes-based payments and playing-out gambles are completely confounded. In the experiments with payments, the outcomes can be used to "keep score." In the experiment without incentives, there is no way to keep score. Could it be that the change in behavior is not driven by payments per se, but rather by playing-out the gambles and allowing subjects to keep score through observing the outcomes? We present results showing that play-out does affect behavior, even when there are no truth-revealing incentive payments. However, payments also have an effect, creating an even more coherent response pattern. Both matter.
IV. Experimental Procedures and Data
We compare three sources of data:
(1) aggregated outcomes from the prior research that replicated Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) with and without incentive payments as reported in Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2010) , (2) individual experiments reported in Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) , Grether and Plott (1979) and Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003) , and (3) new experiments.
The prior research allows us to benchmark our results and place them in context. Our new experiments use essentially the same design and instructions as used in Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003) . Modifications to the instructions depend on the treatment as discussed below.
Treatment variables across experiments include:
(1) whether subjects are paid based on experimental outcomes (which requires that gambles be played-out);
(2) whether subjects have risk preferences induced using the binary lottery procedure (which requires that gambles and lotteries be played-out); (3) whether the gambles are actually played-out (this necessarily occurs when there are outcome-contingent incentive payments, but can be present or not when there are no outcome-based payments). This leads to the design shown in For data in cell P-N-I (gambles played-out, native preferences, and monetary incentives tied to gamble outcomes), we use aggregate data from the literature as reported in Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2010) (labelled "Lit. Agg.") and Grether and Plott's (1979) Experiment 1b (labelled G&P1b) as a benchmark data set. For data in cell NP-N-NI (gambles not played-out, native preferences, no monetary incentives tied to gamble outcomes), we use aggregate data from the literature as reported in Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2010) Native Preferences P-N-NI P-N-I Induced Risk Averse P-RA-NI P-RA-I Induced Risk Neutral P-RN-NI P-RN-I Induced Risk Seeking P-RS-NI P-RS-I
paper ( V. Results
C. Aggregate Results
Table 2 presents summary data across treatments. The first three rows (labeled NP) are all treatments in which gambles were not played-out. The other rows (rows 4-12) are all treatments in which gambles were played-out. As discussed in the prior research (ranging from Grether and Plott (1979) to Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2010) ), reversal rates themselves are largely unaffected by the payment treatment. The lone significant exception is a drop in the reversal rate in treatment P-RA-I, where the gambles are played-out, and subjects are paid based on outcomes under induced risk aversion.
While there is no obvious effect on the level of reversals, Table 2 reveals that there is an effect on the percentage of times the P-bet is preferred in the choice and pricing tasks. Large differences in preferences between the two tasks occur when there are no outcome-based incentives and the gambles are not played-out. In Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) , subjects are much more likely to prefer the P-bet in the choice tasks than in the pricing task (the differenct between the tasks is 0.394). Our replication shows the same result (the difference is 0.276).
In contrast, revealed preference for the P-bet is more similar across tasks when the gambles are played-out, whether or not there are outcome-based incentives. Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2010) , document this effect when subjects are paid (and by construction, gambles are played- out). However, our new experiments reveal that just playing-out the bets reduces the difference between tasks. The difference in P-bet preference across tasks is smaller when the gambles are played-out (P-N-NI) than when they are not played-out (NP-N-NI), even though subjects do not receive truth-revealing monetary incentives. Table 3 shows the conditional reversal rates. In Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003) and (2010), we argue that the pattern of conditional reversal rates under induced risk preferences is consistent with noisy maximization models with error correction.
Consider the data under risk averse preferences (Incentives Category P-RA-I). Subjects should be risk averse. If they "err" in the choice task, by choosing the $-bet (inconsistent with risk aversion), the reversal rate should be high if they correct the "error" in the pricing task. On the other hand, the reversal rate should be low if they choose the P-bet. Similarly, if they err in the pricing task, by pricing the $-bet higher, the reversal rate should be high if they correct the error in the choice task. The rate should be low if they price the P-bet higher. This is exactly the data pattern we observe. Subjects who choose the P-bet reverse 11.4% of the time in the pricing task. Subjects who price the P-bet higher reverse 6.6% of the time in the choice task. In contrast, consistent with error correction, the reversal rates skyrocket if the subjects choose the $-Bet (80.0% of the time) or price the $-Bet higher (87.9% of the time).
Though somewhat weaker, the opposite pattern holds for risk seeking preferences (Incentives Category P-RS-I). Under risk neutral preferences and native preferences, there is no strong pattern in the conditional reversal rate. This is consistent with relatively risk neutral subjects and random errors. While the differences are considerably smaller, they remain under induced preferences even when the subjects are not paid. Under induced risk aversion without outcome-based incentives (Incentives Category P-RA-NI), the $-bet conditional reversal rates exceed the P-bet conditional reversal rates. Under induced risk seeking without outcome-based incentives (Incentives Category P-RS-NI), the P-bet conditional reversal rates exceed the $-bet conditional reversal rates.
The two-error-rate model allows us to ask precisely whether behavior is consistent with noisy maximization. Table 4 shows these estimates from the aggregate data in each incentives category. Just playing-out the gambles clearly has an effect. When gambles are not played-out, (Incentives Category NP-N-NI), the two error rate model cannot accommodate the data. This occurs across individual experiments in the existing literature, on average in the existing literature, and in our new experiment.
When gambles are played-out, the two-error-rate model fits the data exactly in all but one case, and in that case, the difference is insignificant. Estimates of the preferences for the P-bet (q) are highest under induced risk aversion (Incentives Categories P-RA-NI and P-RA-I) and nearly 1 when subjects are paid based on outcomes (Incentives Category P-RA-I). Estimates of the preferences for the P-bet (q) are lowest under induced risk seeking (Incentives Categories P-RS-NI and P-RS-I) and nearly 0 when subjects are paid based on outcomes (Incentives Category P-RS-I).
In summary, our aggregate results show that:
1. Playing-out the gambles (that is, allowing subjects to keep score) generates more economically consistent behavior. 3. The choice patterns are most consistent when subjects are paid based on outcomes.
D. Analysis of Individual Prices
We also ask whether the play-out effect appears in individual pricing decisions. Here, we study the data from the six treatments in Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003) and the three new data sets that use identical gambles, instructions and risk preference induction procedures. The only difference in procedures is that, in the sessions run for this paper, subjects are paid a flat participation fee rather than receiving outcome-contingent payments. In all cases, risk preferences are induced using Berg, Daley, Dickhaut and O'Brien's (1986) lottery procedure with an induced utility function of U(w) = e γw , where w is the payoff from a task and γ=-0.11 for risk averse, γ=0 for risk neutral and γ=0.11 for risk seeking preferences. Under induction, we can compute the theoretical certainty equivalent for each gamble as: 
where CE is the certainty equivalent, h is the high payoff, l is the low payoff and p h is the probability of the high payoff. This provides a benchmark value for each gamble under each risk preference. Table 5 (reproduced from Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003) ) presents the gambles and certainty equivalents for these data sets. The certainty equivalents tell us what prices should be if subjects maximize expected utility under the risk preference induction technique.
We can compare this to actual prices. Alternatively, we can estimate the risk aversion parameter displayed in a particular subject's prices using non-linear regression by setting gamma to minimize the squared deviation between (4) and the actual prices submitted by that subject across the twelve gambles. Table 6 shows the deviations of prices from certainty equivalents for each treatment. On average, induced risk averse subjects over price gambles. There is a significant incentive effect. The overpricing is most severe with no outcomes based incentives and least severe under high incentives levels. Induced risk neutral subjects also tend to over price gambles.
Again, there is a significant incentive effect with the most severe (and most significant) over pricing under no incentives and the least severe (and least significant) over pricing under high incentives. Without incentives, induced risk seeking subjects under price gambles. Again, there is a significant incentive effect. The magnitude of the under pricing falls with incentives and the significance of the under pricing disappears under high incentives. However, notice that often the standard deviation of prices relative to certainty equivalent goes up with incentives. Overall, prices move closer to theoretical predictions as incentives increase even though incentives may not necessarily eliminate noise. This is why reversal rates may not fall with incentives even though prices are more coherent on average. Table 7 shows, for each treatment, median estimates of the risk aversion parameter estimated using non-linear regression. For all subjects, the non-linear regressions converged.
For most subjects, it converged to reasonable estimates. However, a few produce estimates that are clearly outliers (e.g., if a subject prices several gambles above (below) the maximum (minimum) possible payoff, the estimate may show extreme risk seeking (aversion)). Because of these outliers, we use medians as our measure of central tendency and non-parametric signrank and Kruskal-Wallis tests for deviations from predictions and incentives effects.
Median estimates of the risk aversion parameter are all negative for risk aversion (as predicted), but fall short of the predicted level of -0.11. There is a significant incentive effect, with high incentives created more risk averse estimates which are closer to the predicted level. The median induced risk neutral subject without incentives displays a positive (risk seeking) preference parameter. However, when subjects are paid, the medians do not differ significantly from zero. Median induced risk seeking subjects all have positive estimated risk preference parameters (as predicted) but they fall short of the predicted value of 0.11. With increasing incentives, the inter-quartile range does not necessarily fall. As a result, risk preference induction moves subjects in the right direction but not as far as predicted by theory. When there is an incentives effect, higher incentives push behavior closer to predictions. But again, in this context, incentives do not necessarily reduce noise. Figure 5 shows the median estimated risk aversion parameter and inter-quartile ranges under each treatment. While risk averse parameters are always lower and risk seeking parameters are always higher than risk neutral (as predicted), the differences are small and the inter-quartile ranges overlap without incentives (labeled "none"). As incentives increase, the median estimated values remain close to zero (as predicted) for induced risk neutral preferences. They fall dramatically for risk averse induced preferences (as predicted). They rise and level off for risk seeking induced preferences. These effects are significant as shown by the following median regression: 
where the incentives category is a category defined as 0 for no incentives, 1 for low incentives and 2 for high incentives; risk seeking and risk averse dummies are 1 under the appropriate risk preference induction treatments; numbers in parentheses are z-statistics; "***" denotes significance at the 99.9% level of confidence, "**" denotes significance at the 99% level of confidence and "*" denotes significance at the 90% level of confidence.
Without incentives, but playing-out the gambles, subjects appear slightly risk seeking under induced risk neutrality (intercept>0). Inducing risk aversion or risk seeking affects the estimated risk preference parameter significantly in the predicted direction even without incentives (significance on both dummy variables alone with the appropriate signs). Increasing incentives has little effect under induced risk neutrality. Increasing incentives moves estimated risk aversion parameters closer to their predicted values (significance on the interaction terms with the appropriate signs).
VI. Discussion
If subjects reverse preferences systematically depending on how preferences are elicited (e.g., through choice or pricing tasks), it presents serious challenges for economic theory. On the other hand, if subjects have stable preferences, but reveal them with random errors, economic theory simply needs to be extended to allow for errors in revelation. That is, we may need to think of economic agents as "noisy maximizers" instead of strict expected utility maximizers. If this is the case, preference reversal is actually a misnomer. Errors only cause the appearance of reversal.
Previous evidence documenting systematic preference reversals is based on stated preferences over purely hypothetical gambles. Monetary incentives can shift the pattern of the data, making it consistent with noisy maximization. However, previous preference reversal studies documenting incentive effects all confound incentive payments and playing-out gambles. In this paper, we introduce new experimental treatments that allow us to tease apart the effect of truth-revealing incentives from the effect of providing a "score keeping" mechanism through playing-out gambles. This allows us to identify three separate effects that drive data to be more consistent with the stable preference with errors (noisy maximization) model:
1. A monetary incentive "payout effect" that we first documented in Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2010) . When subjects are paid based on the outcomes of the gambles in a truth revealing manner, noisy maximization fits the aggregate data as well as any model could. Apparent reversal rates may still be high because, as the data suggests, subjects do not have strong preferences across the gambles.
2. A "preference effect" that we first documented in Berg, Dickhaut and Rietz (2003) .
When subject risk preferences are induced using a lottery procedure, noisy maximization again fits the data as well as any model could. Revealed preferences consistently shift in the direction predicted by the induced utility function and reversal rates fall. Here, we document the effect even when subjects are not paid based on the outcomes.
3.
A new "play-out effect." When gambles are played-out, even when subjects are not paid based on outcomes, revealed preferences do not differ significantly from noisy maximization. Again, risk preference induction (with play-out, but no payments) leads to data where noisy maximization fits as well as any model could.
Our play-out effect is related to the differences between declared versus revealed preferences (see, for example, Ben-Akiva, et al. (1994) ) where survey responses differ from actual behavior. Hypothetical gambles effectively elicit stated preferences, which reverse in a systematic manner. Played-out gambles with outcome contingent payments reveal preferences that appear stable, but are revealed with error. Data under played-out, but unpaid, gambles appears similar to the revealed preference data. This shows the importance of the play-out effect in generating more economically consistent data. It also suggests that the common practice of running a multi-stage experiment and randomly selecting a single stage for play-out and payoffs ex post may weaken incentives.
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Our results are also related to the literature on incentives effects. While play-out alone has a significant effect, incentives and higher incentives under induced incentives drive behavior closer to that predicted by the induced incentives. While the play-out effect is new, the payment effect is consistent with Jamal and Sunder's (1991) observation that payments are not necessary for convergence in double oral auction markets, but do make the results more reliable. It is also consistent with Camerer and Hogarth's (1999) survey observation that incentives often reduce noise.
Finally, our results are consistent with Donald Trump's observation about money being a score keeping mechanism to determine the winner. It is consistent with subjects having a utility of winning (see, for example, Rietz (1993) or Sheremeta (2010) ) and needing to play-out the gambles to determine whether they "won." It explains why simple mechanisms, such as publishing "employee of the month" could have an effect on behavior even when there is no noticeable incentive tied to the designation. It also helps explain how competitions among groups can have incentives when there are no explicit prizes except "bragging rights." As a participant in this experiment, you will receive points for making decisions. There are 18 decision items in this experiment.
Each decision you make will involve one or more bets. These bets will be indicated by pie charts as shown below. When a bet is played, one ball will be drawn from a bingo cage that contains 36 red balls numbered 1, 2, …, 36. The ball drawn determines the point outcome of the bet. For example, suppose you are playing the bet below. If the red ball drawn was less than or equal to 10, you would receive 30 points. If the red ball drawn was greater than 10, you would receive 5 points. Now let's use the bet shown below as a practice item.
The number that the experimenter drew from the cage of red balls is _____.
This means that I would receive ____ points as a result of this bet.
Part 1:
In this part you will be asked to consider several pairs of bets. For each pair you should indicate which bet you prefer to play or indicate that you are indifferent between them. After each decision, you will have an opportunity to using the following procedure:
1.
The bet you indicate as preferred will be played and you will receive the points indicated by its outcome. If you check "Indifferent" the bet you play will be determined by a coin toss.
Part 2:
In this part you are given several opportunities to play bets to obtain points. For each bet you must indicate the smallest number of points for which you would give up the opportunity to play the bet.
After each decision, you will have an opportunity to receive points using the following procedure: A ball will be drawn from a bingo cage containing 41 green balls numbered 0,1,2,…,40. If the number on this green ball is less than or equal to the number you have specified, you will keep the bet and play it. You will receive the points indicated by the outcome of the bet. If the number on the green ball is greater than the number you have specified, you will give up the bet and in exchange receive the points equal to the number on the ball.
It is in your best interest to be accurate; that is, the best thing you can do is be honest. If the number of points you state is too high or too low, then you are passing up opportunities that you prefer. For example, suppose you would be willing to give up the bet for 20 points but instead you say that the lowest amount for which you would give it up is 30 points. If the green ball drawn at random is between the two (for example 25) you would be forced to play the bet even though you would rather have given it up for 25 points.
On the other hand, suppose that you would give it up for 20 points but not for less, but instead you state your amount as 10 points. If the green ball drawn at random is between the two (for example 15) you would be forced to give up the bet for 15 points even though at that amount you would prefer to play it.
Practice Item 1: Suppose you have the opportunity to play the bet shown below. What is the smallest number of points for which you would give up this opportunity? Decision .
In order which results from this decision, you need to know two things:
(1) The ball drawn from the cage of green balls.
(2) The ball drawn from the cage of red balls.
The two examples in this practice item fix these draws so that you can concentrate on how your decision and the results of the draws will determine your points. Therefore, I would a) receive points equal to the number on the ball and not play the bet.
b) play the bet and receive points according to its outcome.
Will you be playing the bet? (yes/no) If your answer is YES, you will need to know the outcome of the bet before you can determine the points you receive. If your answer is NO, you do not need to know the outcome of the bet to determine the points received.
Suppose the red ball drawn to determine the outcome of the bet was 18.
Based on my point decision above, and the results of the draws from the bingo cages, the number of points I would have is _____.
Complete the next part only if you would have been playing the bet to receive points.
Suppose the red ball drawn to determine the outcome of the bet was 10 instead of 18.
Stop here and wait for the experimenter to tell you to go on to the next practice item.
Practice Item 2: Suppose you have the opportunity to play the bet shown below. What is the smallest number of points for which you would give up this opportunity?
Decision .
The green ball drawn at random is .
The number on this green ball is a) greater than my indicated amount. The red ball drawn to determine the outcome of the bet was .
Part 3:
This part is exactly like Part 1. You will be asked to consider several pairs of bets, and for each pair you should indicate which bet you prefer to play or indicate that you are indifferent between them. After each decision, you will then have an opportunity receive points using the following procedure:
1. The bet you indicate as preferred will be played and you will receive the points indicated by its outcome. If you check "Indifferent" the bet you play will be determined by a coin toss. As a participant in this experiment, you will have opportunities to play for eighteen "prizes." "Prizes" in this experiment have no value, however your objective in this experiment is to win as many prizes as possible. Whether or not you receive a particular prize will be determined by spinning the spinner on your prize wheel. If the spinner stops in the area designated as the WIN area on your prize wheel, then you will receive the prize. If the spinner stops in the area outside the WIN area, then you will receive nothing.
For example, suppose the WIN area of your prize wheel is designated as 0 through 5.
Then, if the spinner stops on a number less than or equal to 5, you will receive the prize. If the spinner stops on a number greater than 5, you will receive nothing. Although the WIN area on your prize wheel will vary, it will always be determined by starting at zero and moving clockwise. Now suppose that the WIN area on your prize wheel is designated as 0 through 30.
Please spin the spinner to determine whether you would have received the prize or not.
So far, you have discovered that a spin on your prize wheel will determine whether or not you receive a prize. However, you need to know how the WIN area on your prize wheel is determined before you can complete the experiment. The markings on the circumference of your prize wheel denote points, and you will receive points for making decisions. There are 18 decision items in this experiment. When a decision is made, the WIN area on your prize wheel will be designated as the area between 0 and the number of points you receive as a result of the decision. Then the spinner on your prize wheel will be spun to determine whether you receive the prize. Points do not accumulate from decision to decision. Each decision you make will involve one or more bets. These bets will be indicated by pie charts as shown below. When a bet is played, one ball will be drawn from a bingo cage that contains 36 red balls numbered 1, 2, …, 36. The ball drawn determines the point outcome of the bet. This point outcome will designate the upper boundary of the WIN area on your prize wheel. In this part you will be asked to consider several pairs of bets. For each pair you should indicate which bet you prefer to play or indicate that you are indifferent between them. After each decision, you will have an opportunity to play for a prize using the following procedure:
2.
The WIN area of your prize wheel will be designated as the area from 0 through the number of points which you have received. You will spin the spinner to determine whether you win the prize.
After each decision, you will have an opportunity to play for a prize using the following procedure:
1. A ball will be drawn from a bingo cage containing 41 green balls numbered 0,1,2,…,40. If the number on this green ball is less than or equal to the number you have specified, you will keep the bet and play it. You will receive the points indicated by the outcome of the bet. If the number on the green ball is greater than the number you have specified, you will give up the bet and in exchange receive the points equal to the number on the ball.
Practice Item 1: Suppose you have the opportunity to play the bet shown below. What is the smallest number of points for which you would give up this opportunity? Remember that the WIN area on your prize wheel will be designated as the area from 0 through the number of points you receive as a result of your decision. In order to determine the WIN area on your prize wheel which results from this decision, you need to know two things:
The two examples in this practice item fix these draws so that you can concentrate on how your decision and the results of the draws will determine your WIN area. If the spinner stopped on the number 40, I would (circle the correct words) win / not win the prize.
Complete this page only if you would have been playing the bet to receive points.
This means that the WIN area of my prize wheel would cover the numbers 0 through _____.
If the spinner stopped on the number 5, I would (circle the correct words) win / not win the prize.
If the spinner stopped on the number 40, I would (circle the correct words) win / not win the prize.
Stop here and wait for the experimenter to tell you to go on to Example 2.
Example 2: Now use your decision in the Practice Item 1 and suppose instead that the green ball drawn at random is 38.
The number on the green ball is a) greater than my indicated amount. b) less than or equal to my indicated amount.
Therefore, I would a) receive points equal to the number on the ball and not play the bet.
Will you be playing the bet? (yes/no) If your answer is YES, you will need to know the outcome of the bet before you can determine the WIN area of your prize wheel. If your answer is NO, you do not need to know the outcome of the bet to determine the WIN area. Suppose the red ball drawn to determine the outcome of the bet was 18.
Practice Item 2: Suppose you have the opportunity to play the bet shown below. What is the smallest number of points for which you would give up this opportunity? Remember that the WIN area on your prize wheel will be designated as the area from 0 through the number of points you receive as a result of your decision.
Based on my decision above, and the results of the draws from the bingo cages, the number of points I would have is _____.
This means that the WIN area of my prize wheel would cover the numbers 0 through _____, My spinner stopped on the number .
Therefore I would have (circle the correct words) won / not won the prize.
Practice Item 3: Suppose you have the opportunity to play the bet shown below. What is the smallest number of points for which you would give up this opportunity? Remember that the WIN area on your prize wheel will be designated as the area from 0 through the number of points you receive as a result of your decision.
The number on this green ball is a) greater than my indicated amount. This part is exactly like Part 1. You will be asked to consider several pairs of bets, and for each pair you should indicate which bet you prefer to play or indicate that you are indifferent between them. After each decision, you will then have an opportunity to play for a prize using the following procedure:
1. The bet you indicate as preferred will be played and you will receive the points indicated by its outcome. If you check "Indifferent" the bet you play will be determined by a coin toss.
